Parties, election campaigning, and the Internet
Toward a comparative institutional approach

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This chapter argues that a comparative approach to analyzing the relationship between technology and political institutions has the potential to offer renewed understanding of the development of the Internet in election campaigning. Taking the different characteristics of political parties and the norms and rules of the electoral environment in the United States and the United Kingdom as an illustration, it suggests that the relationship between technology and political institutions is dialectical. Technologies can reshape institutions, but institutions will mediate eventual outcomes. The chapter outlines five key variables: degree of systemic institutional pluralism; organization of membership; candidate recruitment and selection; campaign finance; and the “old” campaign communication environment. This approach has the potential to generate a theoretical framework for explaining differences in the impact of the Internet on election campaigning across liberal democracies.

Since the mid 1990s, it has been widely predicted that the Internet will have a decisive influence on election campaigning. This prophecy has, in part at least, been fulfilled in the United States, especially since Howard Dean’s blog-fuelled campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination in the 2003–4 primary season, the widespread impact of online video during the 2006 midterm elections, and the proliferation of Web 2.0 social media during the 2007–8 contest.

It is tempting to think that this “success story” has been driven by the diffusion of the Internet. By 2005, 76 percent of Americans were recorded as being online (International Telecommunication Union, 2005). And, despite ongoing divisions in patterns of use, the overwhelming majority of people have integrated information and communication technologies into their everyday lives (Horrigan, 2007). Since the public get their news, do their shopping, and communicate with friends online, it is hardly surprising that they are also being citizens.

However, technology diffusion explanations of changes in election campaigning only tell part of the story. There are other countries with high levels of Internet diffusion, in which it has yet to have such a significant impact. In the United Kingdom, while more than 60 percent of the population are now online (International Telecommunication Union, 2005), there is consensus that the Internet has had only a marginal influence on elections, a fact noted on numerous occasions during both the 2001 and 2005 national polls (Coleman and Hall, 2001; Ward, 2005). It seems perverse, therefore, to suggest that once Internet penetration...
reaches some kind of critical mass (whatever that may be) a decisive political impact somehow becomes inevitable. Given the unevenness of the role played by the net in electoral contests across even the liberal democratic world, we must look for additional explanations for national differences.

One element of such an explanation may be found by considering how the Internet interacts with the relevant political institutions that pre-date its existence: in particular, the organization of political parties and the norms and rules of the electoral environment. These vary greatly across political systems. Different types of party organization and electoral environment have the potential to catalyze or to retard the development of Internet campaigning because they render new communication technologies more or less useful to candidates and parties seeking office. When viewed in comparative context, American parties are unusual political organizations, and quite dissimilar to those found in other, notably European, liberal democracies. Such differences may help explain the quantitative and qualitative differences in Internet campaigning across countries.

This is not to suggest that research on Internet campaigning has lacked an international orientation. Rigorous individual country studies are growing in number. But, to echo the opening comments of Foot et al.’s chapter in this volume, with a few exceptions (for example, the editors’ conclusion in Gibson et al. (eds), 2003c; Newell, 2001; Tkach-Kawasaki, 2003), very little of the research on parties and Internet campaigning is grounded in cross-national comparison of relevant political institutions. Gibson et al. (2003) conducted a comparative survey of candidate websites in the United States and the United Kingdom, but excluded variables related to parties and the electoral environment. Zittel (2004) focused, not on campaign dynamics, but on individual legislators’ adoption of the Internet. Again, this involved a survey of legislator websites in three countries, correlated with independent variables: age of legislator, constituency demographics, the electoral system, and type of government. The latter was not disaggregated but defined in basic terms as “presidential” versus “parliamentary”. Foot et al.’s highly illuminating chapter in this volume, while focusing on a wide range of political actors and featuring sophisticated dependent variables that signal the growth of online campaign “web spheres”—nevertheless downgrades political institutions in the overall analysis. The closest of several independent variables, termed “political culture” is, understandably given the scale and ambition of the Internet and Elections Project from which it is drawn, defined and measured solely in terms of individual citizen attitudes and self-reported behavior.

Institutions proximate to election campaigns can have a direct impact on the mobilization of resources, acting as catalysts and anti-catalysts. At their most extreme, institutional structures may act as complete barriers. Examples include the ban on the purchase of television advertising in the United Kingdom, or on podcasting in Singapore. Most of the time institutions may simply make the process of deploying resources unattractive, as would be the case if stringent regulatory hurdles had to be overcome to set up a political website, for instance. Opportunity costs are also entailed in choosing to deploy a particular resource. A large billboard purchase may cut the number of mailings a party can send; dedicating campaign staff to a blogging campaign may remove them from face-to-face roles. The Internet may reconfigure or reduce opportunity costs but it does not destroy them. The benefits political actors are able to derive are thus strongly
influenced by the institutional environment (March and Olsen, 1989).

This chapter argues that a comparative approach to analyzing the relationship between technology and political institutions has the potential to offer renewed understanding of the development of the Internet in election campaigning. Taking the different characteristics of political parties and the norms and rules of the electoral environment in the United States and the United Kingdom as an illustration, it aims to show that the relationship between technology and political institutions is best perceived as dialectical. Technologies can reshape institutions, but institutions will mediate eventual outcomes. This approach has the potential to generate a theoretical framework for explaining differences in the impact of the Internet on election campaigning across liberal democracies.

**Normalizers, optimists, and institutions**

The lack of comparative institutional research on Internet campaigning is perhaps best explained by the terms of reference that have dominated discussion of Internet politics more generally. Since the net’s early days, analysis of its political impact has been dominated by two distinct schools of thought: the normalizers, who claim that current political relationships and power distributions will ultimately be replicated online, and the optimists, who claim that the Internet will reform politics and radically redistribute political power. These two camps are descendents of an older debate between sociological and technological determinisms: between those who claim that the impact of technology is shaped by social and political institutions and those who believe technology has the power to shape society and politics. While the debate between normalizers and optimists has been useful in creating much of the significant early analysis of the Internet, it has also proved limiting. Both sides have generally paid insufficient attention to the complex interaction between technology and political institutions.

While institutions have often been neglected by the normalizers and the optimists, they have at least had an implied significance. Normalization theory argues that the broader resources available to political actors, such as money, bureaucracy, supporter networks, or an interested mainstream media, will heavily condition their ability to make effective use of the Internet for campaigning (see, for example, Davis, 1999; Margolis and Resnick, 2000). Online advantage accrues to the strongest online actors. In their influential book, *Politics as Usual*, Michael Margolis and David Resnick (2000: 2) argue that cyberspace “will be molded by the everyday struggle for wealth and power.”

The relationship between normalization and political institutions can be critically understood in two ways. First, the theory is socially deterministic. It assumes that pre-Internet power brokers will come to define the online world, autonomously of technological change. It therefore neglects important differences between old media of political communication, particularly the paper press and television, and new, low-cost, low-threshold interactive and participatory media. Second, in normalization theory, existing institutions offer a framework for the explanation that political behavior will remain normal. The problem is that, when situated in a cross-national comparative context, it is best seen not as a universal truth but as a matter for investigation. The question we must ask is: what kinds of institutional features are more likely to have affinities with the particular technological affordances of Internet
communication? A comparative approach allows us to hypothesize what may, or may not, gain traction in different political systems.

The relationship between institutions and the case made by Internet optimists is more difficult to disentangle, largely because they do not form a single school but can be divided into two broad categories according to their attitudes to representative democracy. Most applicable to the American experience is what can be termed representative democracy optimism. This approach does not argue that the Internet will destroy all representative institutions, but instead claims that it has the potential to reform and rehabilitate indirect vehicles of democratic participation, most notably political parties and elections (for example, Trippi, 2004).

This distinction between representative democracy optimists and direct democracy optimists is significant. However, both posit a monocausal relationship between technology and politics: existing political institutions will either be reformed or entirely replaced under the weight of technological change. This is grounded in how the characteristics of the Internet differ from previously dominant media of political communication, most notably television. The necessities of the television age political campaign are said to have made parties centralized and steeply hierarchical, and grass-roots activism and civic life are said to have become emaciated (Trippi, 2004: 37–40, 214–15). The televisual form is one-to-many; the Internet offers rapid, distributed, multidirectional, interactive, many-to-many communication.

Criticisms of technological determinism are of course manifold, and cannot detain us here (see Roe Smith, 1994). But from our perspective, devaluing the role of non- or pre-Internet organizational structures, norms, and rules, in mediating technological forces, and how these processes may vary across political systems, renders such an approach problematic as a framework for the explanation of the development of Internet campaigning.

In summary, normalization and Internet optimism approaches do not adequately consider the possibility that some political institutions, as currently arranged, are likely to act as a catalyst for the integration of the Internet into election campaigning, while others may not.

America’s online success story

While the chronicles of headline-grabbing examples of Internet campaigning now feature several countries, it is on the United States that most interest, both popular and academic, has focused. This is unsurprising: the country can claim to be the birthplace of the Internet; it is the only global hyperpower; its elections are followed throughout the world; and interest in its politics is strongly linked to the idea of Americanization, which suggests convergence in electoral politics, especially in styles of campaign communication (see, for example, Farrell et al., 2001; Kavanagh, 1995, Negrine and Papathanassopoulos, 1996).

The Internet’s potential has long been apparent. In the 1998 Minnesota gubernatorial contest, Independent candidate Jesse Ventura, running against well-established Democratic and Republican candidates, used the net to organize and publicize campaign rallies in the hours before polls closed (Greer and LaPointe, 2004: 117; Klotz, 2004: 71). In the Republican presidential primary contest in 2000, following his unexpected win in New Hampshire, John McCain was able
to raise $3 million in donations in ten days (Klotz, 2004: 77), an unprecedented feat at the time. During the presidential contest that year, Al Gore organized an innovative series of online “town hall” style discussion forums.

However, it was Howard Dean’s candidacy for the Democratic nomination for the presidency in 2004 that really seemed to fulfill the early promise of the Internet as a campaigning tool. Dean was little known nationally, though his continued opposition to the war in Iraq did give him a platform distinct from the other candidates in the Democratic field. During the early phase of the primaries, Dean struggled to get his campaign off the ground: his opinion poll ratings were within the margin of error of zero and he was woefully short of cash and known supporters. At the end of 2002, Dean’s campaign team restructured its online presence, in order to test the networking and fund-raising potential of the Internet. By the end of 2003, Dean had gone from being an unknown candidate with very few financial resources to the leader in the race and the most successful primary fund-raiser in the history of the Democratic Party (Chadwick, 2007; Hindman, 2005; Trippi, 2004).

Following on from Dean’s success, the eventual winner of the Democratic nomination, John Kerry, while relying mainly on large donors to get him through the primaries (defined by Hindman, 2005 as those who give the federal maximum of $2000), nevertheless used the Internet to raise a large number of small donations during the main campaign. This allowed Kerry, in a situation unprecedented for a Democrat, to achieve near financial parity with his Republican opponent, George W. Bush, by the close of the 2004 campaign (Dwyer et al., 2004).

The 2006 midterms continued to offer effective demonstrations of the power of the Internet. During the Democratic primary for the Senate seat in Connecticut, three-term Senator and former candidate for the vice presidency, Joe Lieberman, was defeated by journeyman candidate Ned Lamont, who had only previously held local office. Lieberman was an outspoken defender of the Iraq war, a stance that put him at odds with many grass-roots Democrats, while Lamont worked to portray himself as an anti-war candidate. Lamont’s attempt to defeat Lieberman was embraced by high-profile Democratic bloggers, the so-called “netroots,” who promoted his candidacy, raised money, and even starred in celebrity-style campaign commercials. The Internet was important in creating momentum for Lamont: he convincingly defeated Lieberman in the primary (Murray, 2006; Ned Lamont for Senate, 2006).

The main midterm election period of 2006 continued to feature extensive use of the net. The most notorious episode came during the race for the Virginia Senate seat. Republican incumbent George Allen was expected to comfortably retain his position, as the precursor to a possible presidential run in 2008. However, some months before the election, Allen was filmed referring to Democratic opponent Jim Webb’s campaign worker as a “macaca”, a racist term. The DIY video of this event was immediately uploaded onto media-sharing site YouTube, and soon became a viral sensation, leading to Allen’s views on race being questioned both online and, crucially, in mainstream newsprint and television media. From being 20 points ahead in the polls at the end of April, Allen went on to lose (CNN, 2006; NOI, 2006; YouTube, 2006). By the time of the close of the 2006 elections, it was also clear that the netroots movement MoveOn, by campaigning in support of several successful Senate and House
candidates, had exerted influence on the Democratic takeover of Congress. Soon after the election, MoveOn’s website displayed a table of statistics for the pivotal districts, including margin of victory, financial contributions, and number of phone calls to voters. It mobilized volunteers to make seven million calls and host 7,500 house parties (MoveOn, 2007). Although hard data are lacking, it seems fair to suggest that Allen’s defeat in Virginia was caused by the viral effect of the YouTube video. Certainly a Republican online campaigning guidebook for the 2008 elections suggested that this was the case (National Republican Senatorial Committee, 2007). And, as Davis et al. reveal in their chapter in this volume, the 2006 midterms and the early stages of the 2007–8 primary season witnessed the growing use of online social networking sites such as MySpace and Facebook, with Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama amassing hundreds of thousands of members in supporter networks.

From this very brief depiction of high-profile cases it is evident that the Internet plays a great many roles in the American campaign environment, whether it be creating political networks, promoting discussion of politics, raising funds, or storing, retrieving, and automating information (Howard, 2006).

Britain’s online non-events?

Observers of British elections have long been wondering if the Internet campaign phenomena witnessed in the United States will make their way across the Atlantic. United Kingdom campaign managers eagerly followed the 2000 presidential contest in an effort to “learn lessons” (Gibson et al., 2003a: 51). Overall, however, the net had little impact on the 2001 general election. Only seven percent of citizens claimed to have used it to look for election information, compared with 74 percent for newspapers and 89 percent for television (MORI, 2001). It appears to have played only a marginal role in influencing how individuals decided to vote, and candidates’ online presences, though improving, were not as developed as those of their American counterparts.

By the 2005 British general election, evidence was emerging that Internet campaigning was shaping political behavior. Some British MPs were using the net to reach out to supporters outside the traditional structures of party, via e-mail distribution lists, for example, which performed some of the functions performed by blogs (Jackson, 2004). Around 50 parliamentary candidates blogged during the 2005 campaign (Kimber, 2005). While the Internet presence of candidates was an improvement over 2001, it was clear that the Internet did not play the role it did in the 2004 U.S. campaign. Blogging remains very much a minority sport among British parliamentarians (Ward and Francoli, 2007).

In the period following the 2005 election, as social media and social networking trends reached Britain, politicians began to experiment with YouTube, MySpace, and Facebook. A handful of prominent politicians, including government minister David Miliband, began high-profile blogs. In the spring of 2006, Labour Party leader Tony Blair ordered a rethink of the party’s approach to web campaigning. This led to the creation of the Labor Supporters Network, an e-mail list designed to appeal to those who were not willing or able to become fully paid-up party members, and MpURL Membersnet, a social network site that provides each party member with a blog, each local constituency Labour Party organization with an online discussion forum, and a number of general policy-related forums. Meanwhile, the
Conservative Party’s new leader, David Cameron, pioneered the use of viral online video in mainstream British politics, with his Webcameron video blog. Labour’s deputy leadership contest in the spring of 2007 saw all candidates engage with Web 2.0 platforms such as Facebook and MySpace. Thus there are some tentative signs that British parties are integrating the net. But does this mean that they will converge on the American model? And, if so, to what extent? The next section seeks to provide a framework for answering such questions through a consideration of the differences between the United States and United Kingdom party and electoral environments.

Party organization and electoral environment: catalysts and anti-catalysts for Internet election campaigning

The British and American party organizations and electoral environments have much in common. When it comes to national elections, both are historically embedded two-party systems: only two parties have a realistic chance of securing executive power; single-party executives are the norm at the national level (not at the devolved level in the United Kingdom); and parties “take turns” in controlling the executive. Both countries have simple plurality electoral systems based on geographical constituencies, and this reinforces the two-party system.

But there are highly significant differences between the two countries. For the purposes of this chapter, these may be mapped along five distinct, though interrelated, dimensions: the degree of systemic institutional pluralism; the organization of membership; candidate recruitment and selection; campaign finance; and the “old” campaign communication environment. The aim here is to show how differences between the United States and the United Kingdom in each of these areas may be used to hypothesize the distinct characteristics of online election campaigning in each political system.

Degree of systemic institutional pluralism

Federalism and the separation of powers, both key constitutional values in the United States, guarantee substantial institutional pluralism. This weakens national party integration (Epstein, 1980; Harmel and Janda, 1982; Key, 1964). The separate electoral bases of the presidency and Congress provide few incentives for party cohesion. Parties have state and local committees but their influence and level of organization differs significantly from state to state. Many state committees are flimsy, and where there are traditions of strong party organization, such as in New York state or Pennsylvania, these are still only weakly integrated with the national committees in Washington. Parties are important for government formation and affiliation remains a very strong predictor of congressional behavior, but away from the capitol, state and local party structures have few direct policy-making roles. National party committees are institutionally separate from the party organizations inside Congress, and while there are differences between the states, much the same can be said of the relationship between state legislatures and state-level party committees. The national committees have grown in influence since the 1970s, yet they are still of less importance during presidential races than the staff and infrastructure built up by candidates themselves during both the primary season and the main campaign. Even the most nationally-oriented electoral contest—for the presidency—necessarily
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becomes a matter of localized campaigning in targeted key states, due to the electoral college system. In the lexicon of Samuel Eldersveld (1982), the American party system is stratarchical rather than hierarchical. Layers of party organization, driven by factionalism along several dimensions, are only loosely joined.

Contrast this with the United Kingdom, where the separation of powers is strictly circumscribed by the near-fusion of the legislature and the executive (Lijphart, 1984) and where, despite recent devolution reforms, the state is unitary. The prime minister and Parliament share an electoral base, incentivizing party cohesion in the interests of policy success for the government and re-election for MPs. British parties are characterized by greater levels of national coordination and integration, and while there are different political traditions associated with party activism in localities, the party structures are internally uniform. Local constituency organizations enjoy policy-making influence but despite recent trends toward internal democratization, national headquarters exert close control over the whole party. While some local associations can and do deviate from the leadership’s script, national party organizations nevertheless have a major influence on the election campaign by channeling resources, coordinating activity, and applying sanctions (Ware, 1996). British parties are comparatively integrated and hierarchical rather than stratarchical.

How do these characteristics interact with the technological affordances of the Internet? The pluralistic environment in the United States necessitates building campaign networks composed of horizontal and vertical connections that mesh with the fundamentally stratarchical basis of the system. Integration can be achieved in a way that leaves intact the operative norms of federalism and the separation of powers, but which provides lines of communication between levels of party organization and activists. The Internet provides for granular communication that allows party staff to quickly switch from local to state to national focus and vice versa. It also reinforces the trend, since the 1970s, towards a more active coordinating role for the national party committees. Yet, in a system where state party organizations often jealously guard their autonomy, the open, looser networks afforded by Internet communication fit well.

Compare this with the United Kingdom, where, as we have noted, the separation of powers is weak, federalism absent, and parties comparatively integrated and hierarchical. There, though constituency-level organizations can be rebellious, the lines of communication are more vertically oriented, more firmly drawn, and are based in long-established formal structures with accompanying bureaucracies. The Internet’s technological affordances for creating loose horizontal networks have fewer affinities with this set of arrangements. We can hypothesize that it is more likely that British parties will deploy the Internet in ways that jell with internal routinized institutional traits. This is evidenced, for example, by the MpURL Membersnet, which is a members-only layer of web applications that map onto long-standing internal party structures.

Organization of membership

In his classic work on party systems, Duverger (1954) suggested that British (and other European) parties were organizationally “superior” because they developed durable mass membership and participation infrastructures. Revisionists such as Epstein (1980) have suggested that the weaker American party model is better suited to the age of leader-focused, televisual politics. Either way, American
parties do not have a system of individual membership, though there is a chance for ordinary party supporters to play a role in the selection of candidates through the primary system (see below). Nor do they have a leader embedded in their structure, but instead rely on a successful presidential candidate to lead the party once elected. Parties in Congress are often described as “headless”: there is no concept of permanent opposition (Janda, 1993: 164). The once decisive role of the party convention in policy discussion and nomination has, since the 1970s, been hollowed out. And, as we have seen, the difficulty of coordinating solidarity resources in American parties is affected by federalism and the separation of powers.

The lack of a permanent membership necessarily makes American parties heavily campaign focused. Candidates seeking office are required to develop their own campaign infrastructure, based around personal support for their platform. This is reinforced by the primary system, which features a large-scale campaign from which elements of the party’s organization, such as national and state committees, are sometimes marginalized. United States politics is candidate centered.

In the United Kingdom, parties have an organic existence outside of election campaigns; they are organs of policy and participation and have (currently declining) memberships. National party conferences differ in terms of policy influence from party to party, but conferences do retain a residual policy-making role. Local, regional, and national policy forums provide opportunities for rank-and-file activists to participate. While campaign machinery does tend to deteriorate during the periods between elections, greater institutional presence and continuous membership do not create pressures to continually rebuild from scratch. There is a strong tradition of organized opposition in British politics, spearheaded by the permanent party leader of the second largest party in Parliament and his or her shadow cabinet. In Britain, parties have pre-formed structures containing activists inherited by successive leaders. United Kingdom politics is party centered.

The often temporary and short-lived associations that constitute the American campaign offer strong incentives for using the Internet. The most successful and publicized examples, for example Howard Dean’s use of Meetup or Barack Obama’s creation of Facebook groups (Goldfarb, 2007) in the earliest possible stages of the campaign are attempts to construct an online network of supporters and activists at the lowest possible cost and often well in advance of organization on the ground. We may also consider this from the perspective of activists themselves, who seek policy influence and expressive benefits from political participation. For such individuals, the Internet provides these earlier and, for some it seems, with greater intensity than in the “old” campaign environment.

In the United Kingdom, while volunteer activists are hardly in abundant supply, the party membership is at least a pre-existing resource that can be tapped in more routinized and predictable ways by party elites, candidates, and members alike. Party elites often engage in administrative reform of internal structures to realize political or bureaucratic goals (Webb, 2000), but the sense of fast-moving organizational fluidity, even chaos, that often characterizes American candidates’ attempts to mobilize support is not evident.

Recent developments in Britain do, however, suggest that the Internet may be catalyzing some aspects of party membership organization. The permanent membership base of British parties has been eroding for several decades. This incentivizes parties to seek alternative models. As
mentioned in our brief description of election campaigning, the Labour Party’s new “supporters network” and its internal social networking model, MpURL Membersnet, deliberately seek to attract those who do not commit to old-style party membership, or those who do not engage with traditional face-to-face participatory structures. This is not to suggest that British parties are converging on the U.S. model. Significant differences will persist, as British parties mold the technology in their own ways. Hence, Labour’s Chair Hazel Blears’ view that “We don’t want a U.S.-style party with a loose coalition of supporters, rather than an active membership” (Blears, 2007).

Our assumption is that technology can shape institutions but institutions will mediate eventual outcomes.

**Candidate recruitment and selection**

In the United States, mechanisms for the recruitment and selection of candidates offer an institutional framework for sanctioned dissent (Bogdanor, 1984: x). Distrust of the corruption and patronage of urban party machines led to the early twentieth century reforms specifically designed to weaken party bosses and increase citizen influence via devices such as the initiative, the referendum, and the recall, but most significantly, primary elections. While practices have differed across the states, since the 1970s, primaries have become fundamental to U.S. politics. Uncertainty and risk are much greater for both party elites and candidates than their equivalents in Britain. Participation in primaries is restricted, but the thresholds are low. One must simply register as a Democrat or Republican, in some cases only a few weeks before the ballot. While caucus selection has not entirely disappeared, many caucus votes are in any case characterized by the same degree of fluidity and openness as witnessed during primaries (McKay, 2005: 93).

Primaries are absent from the British party system. Internal competition between contenders takes place in arenas sealed off from direct participation by the general public. United Kingdom parties do have internal procedures, which, to varying extents, involve mass memberships in the selection of national leadership positions, and permanent local constituency associations select their local party candidates, subject to the final approval of central staff. But electoral rules guarantee party elites a significant power bloc in national leadership contests, parliamentary candidates are heavily vetted by central party elites, and the committees of local constituency activists are usually small and exclusive. The environment for candidate selection is much less open and fluid, much more tightly managed, and more nationally-oriented than is the case in the United States.

It is notable that in the United States, most of the Internet campaigning innovations (McCain during 1999–2000; Dean during 2003–4; Lamont during 2006; Obama during 2007–8) have occurred during primaries. Primary elections may be influenced but cannot be controlled by the parties themselves. Resources permitting, any individual may run for the nomination and those without “establishment” party backing have found the Internet particularly attractive for garnering support. In Dean’s case, an outsider candidate found that he could use the net to quickly ratchet up a campaign in the early primary stages in an attempt to reduce the costs of overcoming sheer geographical scale and the complexity of the different state-level contests. The uncertainty of the primary environment forces candidates to cast around for opportunities to build what are often
frail and fleeting coalitions of support. In some respects, candidates can use the Internet to try to reduce this uncertainty and risk. When the risks are high but the costs of organizational innovation are low, candidates are more likely to experiment, for example by trying to tap into multiple online networks. During the 2007–8 primary campaign, John Edwards’ campaign was notorious for spreading its bets across practically all of the important Web 2.0 sites and applications, including 43Things, Del.icio.us, Essembly, Facebook, Flickr, Gather, MySpace, Partybuilder, YouTube, Ning, Metacafe, Revver, Yahoo! 360°, Blip.tv, CHBN, vSocial, Tagworld, CollectiveX, Bebo, Care2, Hi5, Xanga, and LiveJournal (Edwards, 2007).

This conjuncture of institutions and technological affordances may be especially applicable to the Democratic Party, for whom the institution of the primary was created, in its modern form, with the goal of empowering activists. The disagreement between much of the party elite and its base over the Iraq war has fueled the most prominent web campaigns, most notably those of Dean, Paul Hackett, and Lamont. Institutions (the primary) and technology came together to form a mutually reinforcing environment for grass-roots dissent. At the same time, however, it still needs to be recognized that factors such as the lack of a fully “national” campaign domain, the complexities of different state-level contexts, and the command of territorial scale required of a successful U.S. primary candidacy are important institutional constraints. These may be softened but cannot totally be overcome by the Internet. Dean found this to his cost when it actually came to the ballots.

Lacking primaries and having much greater control over candidate recruitment and selection, British parties operate within a radically different environment. Factionalism, dissent, and risk are important factors in British party selection processes (Webb, 2000), but they are deliberately managed, or are not permitted such blatant institutional expression (Ware, 1996). The “selectorate” is a combination of party elites and members, but those members are fully paid up. It would be unusual to see large numbers of citizens join a British party just to participate in an internal election campaign: the threshold is too high. And while candidates must be seen to be impressive in the face of broader public opinion, they nevertheless know that the internal electoral rules and timetable are fixed and nationally uniform, and that there will (literally) be no outsider candidates. In this environment, there are fewer incentives to take advantage of the Internet for lowering costs and reducing uncertainty and risk by spreading a campaign across a wide range of networks.

Campaign finance

The campaign finance environment differs significantly across the two political systems. We focus here on three factors, all of which mediate the Internet as an aid to fund-raising.

First, there is the matter of scale and significance. American politics, by the standards of anywhere else in the world, is expensive. Indeed, there is much talk of 2008 being the first $1 billion election (Malbin and Cain, 2007: 4). In contrast, in the 12 months preceding the 2005 British general election, the combined spending of the Labour and Conservative Parties was just £90 million ($185 million) (Phillips, 2007: 13). Furthermore, the acquisition of money is central to success in American politics. Electoral primaries, for example, are preceded by what is termed “the money primary”, where candidates’ electoral viability is assessed by their ability to raise funds from donors (Adkins and Dowdle, 2002).
process received a great deal of coverage in anticipation of the 2008 presidential primary season, with much comment being made on Barack Obama’s success as a fund-raiser and the relative failure of John McCain to gather the funds considered necessary for a successful nomination bid (Heileman, 2007; MacAskill, 2007). There is no comparable institution in British politics. The importance of financial resources to American politics ensures that political actors are quick to exploit the potential of new revenue streams. This has certainly been the case online, where candidates, most notably Democrats, have proved to be adept at raising vast sums of money (Dwyer et al., 2004). Through the institution of the money primary, it is possible for American citizens to have quite a direct impact on political outcomes. For this reason, it is a far more rational course of action for Americans to make political donations. The Internet has made this more apparent, by lowering the barrier to participation and making it easier for citizens to contribute to their preferred candidate.

Second, the American political system exhibits a diverse range of donation opportunities. This is a direct consequence of the pluralistic nature of American parties. Even the national parties each contain three committees to which donations can be sent: the national committee, the house party, and the senate party. Then there are party organizations at state and regional level. Money can also be given directly to candidates for office, both during the primary season (when givers will have a choice between many candidates), and then in the main electoral contest. In contrast, the centralized nature of British parties offers far fewer opportunities for individuals to donate. The vast majority of political donations in Britain are given to the national headquarters of a party. In 2005, nearly 85 percent of the £38 million of cash contributions given to the Conservative and Labor Parties and itemized by the U.K. Electoral Commission went straight to the central party organization, with only the remaining 15 percent going to sub-national bodies (U.K. Electoral Commission, 2005).

Third, the two countries employ vastly different regulatory systems, based on diametrically opposed principles. This has historically been the case, but has been further reinforced by recent legal decisions and legislation. In America, attempts to regulate political finance have focused on declaring and capping donations. The 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act required disclosure of donations to candidates, while a 1974 amendment to the act, passed in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal, imposed a donation cap of $1000. This law was upheld by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo (1976).

However, the same hearing also ruled two significant provisos, both of which were to have huge implications for campaign finance in the United States. While caps on donations were deemed legal, any caps on spending were deemed unconstitutional, on the grounds they would breach the first amendment right to free speech. The Supreme Court also ruled that only donations made directly for the purpose of election campaigning would fall under the auspices of donation limits. In reality the distinction between electoral campaigning and issue advertising proved to be very fine, and it was this element of the ruling that led to the distinction between hard and soft money in American politics. Hard money donations to candidates fell under the remit of the Federal Election Commission and were limited by the Federal Election Campaign Act. In contrast, soft money existed outside this regulatory framework and, provided it was not used to directly endorse a candidate, could be gathered in unlimited
The most recent attempt to close this loophole in the law was the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act (often referred to by the names of its Senate sponsors, McCain and Feingold). At the same time as raising the hard money donation limit to $2000 per candidate, this legislation also prohibited political parties or committees within parties from gathering soft money donations. However, in-keeping with the *Buckley v. Valeo* ruling, the act allowed organizations campaigning on issues to receive unlimited donations. Many of the 527 groups (so-called because their status was defined under clause 527 of the U.S. tax code) that were created after the passing of McCain–Feingold are highly partisan and only quasi-autonomous from electoral campaigns, although barred from having direct contact with candidates seeking office. The Internet lends itself to this type of loose political association. For example, Moveon.org is a 527 group, and thus legally defined as non-partisan. However, through its base of Internet supporters, it is able to organize large-scale campaigns to aid Democratic causes and candidates. Through the network structures of online organizations, it becomes possible for “separate” organizations to coordinate their actions more effectively, to become virtually if not actually interlocking, and, in some cases, to have a significant impact on elections (MoveOn, 2007).

In contrast, in Britain, there are no caps on donations to political parties. Individuals and organizations are legally able to give any sums they wish. As a result, a significant proportion of donations to British political parties come from a small number of large donors. It has been estimated that a donations cap of £5000 (approximately five times the cap imposed by McCain–Feingold in the U.S.) would deny British parties nearly 90 percent of their current income (Grant, 2005: 390). Instead, British legislation on campaign finance has sought to curb spending. The Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act 1883 imposed constituency spending caps on candidates, in an effort to prevent the purchase of office. The advent of organized and wealthy political parties with mass memberships during the twentieth century led to calls for a similar national spending cap. Such a cap was only introduced by The Political Parties, Elections and Referendum Act 2000 (PPEREA), which limited a party’s national spending based on the number of constituencies it was contesting (Kelly, 2005).

In the U.K. then, unhindered by donation caps, politicians are able to rely on fewer, large contributions to fund their electioneering (as well as still receiving significant sums from party members). They have fewer incentives to develop support from large numbers of small donors. In contrast, in the U.S., candidates necessarily need to solicit contributions from a large number of supporters. The Internet has proved to be the perfect environment for this element of electoral campaigning. Indeed, there is some evidence that the Internet is changing the types of donations being received by candidates. In particular, the 2004 presidential election saw an increase in the number of small donations (usually defined as less than $200, the level at which they must be reported individually to the Federal Election Commission), a change for which the Internet was seen as partially responsible (Graf et al., 2006). In total, 61 percent of Dean’s funds came from donations of less than $200 (Hindman, 2005: 124). Some have even gone as far as to argue that the Internet, as a mechanism for giving, is creating a new era of “small dollar democracy” (Schmitt, 2007).
“Old” campaign communication environment

Our final dimension concerns how the older campaign communication environment, particularly the roles of television and targeted marketing, shapes incentives for political actors when it comes to the Internet.

Internet campaigning does not exist in a media vacuum. Since the 1970s in the United States, paid-for television advertising has been one of the most important and most expensive aspects of the campaign. Advertising is largely unregulated. Candidates may buy as many slots as they are able to afford or calculate the public will bear. In addition, quasi-independent organizations affiliated with a candidate may also purchase airtime. As is well known, the United States was in the vanguard of the so-called professionalization of political campaigning. The campaign industry, with its pollsters, consultants, speechwriters, and direct marketers was, long before the arrival of the Internet, strongly attuned to the role played by television in shaping electoral opinion and has ruthlessly packaged political campaigns for indirect dissemination via mainstream news media. It has equally ruthlessly developed strategies for direct marketing via old technologies (phone and mail) especially in key swing states during presidential campaigns.

Party-controlled television content is a mere sideshow in the United Kingdom, where such political advertising is outlawed. British parties are allotted a handful of regulated “party election broadcasts” during a campaign and while the audiences for these are reasonably large, they are of short duration. However, the rise of the professional campaign in Britain during the 1980s and 1990s has led to the U.S.-style “packaging” of candidates for the mainstream news media, which is of greater importance for citizens’ political information in the United Kingdom (Farrell et al., 2001; Franklin, 2004). Similarly, direct marketing strategies have grown in importance.

Theorizing differences across our two countries in this area is more complex. In general, the Internet seems to be less effective than television in reaching undecided voters (Klotz, 2004: 64). Such voters are less likely to be motivated to seek out political information using a purposive medium (Bimber and Davis, 2003). Winning elections is about raising candidate visibility among undecided voters in key marginal constituencies. Television and direct marketing have obvious benefits when compared with online campaigning in this regard, because they can be targeted to specific sets of voters. Internet phenomenon MoveOn used TV advertisements and phone canvassing to great effect in the 2006 midterms, as its website proudly proclaims (MoveOn, 2007).

A further disincentive to devoting professional campaign resources to the Internet is its unpredictability and risk when compared with older methods, as the Virginia “macaca” incident revealed. Equally, though, these things are not down to pure chance. Jessica Vanden Berg, the campaign manager of Jim Webb, George Allen’s Democratic opponent, revealed a detailed account of the carefully managed campaign that launched the video, involving leaks to the mainstream media and to favored bloggers (NOI, 2006). Such events require dedicated, skilled, and well-connected campaign teams. The Internet campaign also produces opportunity costs that must be paid for by comparative neglect of other aspects of campaign communication. A characteristic response in the United States has in part been to try to mold the use of information and communication technologies to reflect the norms of the
old communication environment. Political actors have looked for ways to have the Internet do the old jobs, only smarter. Howard (2006) has demonstrated the centrality to the online campaign of the storage, retrieval, and automation of vast quantities of information, the targeting of individual voters, and geodemographic data mining.

Similar factors are shaping British developments. The Labour Supporters Network and MpURL Membersnet are unobtrusive means of gathering data on party members. Targeted e-mail and mobile text messaging are now familiar features of the campaign landscape. However, the British experience also reveals a growing exuberance among politicians who see the potential of the Internet to bypass the constraints of mainstream media and the heavily regulated television environment. This was precisely the reasoning behind the creation of the Conservative Party leader David Cameron’s video blog, Webcameron, according to campaign staff. Thus we see a mix of potentialities in this field. The predominance of television and old-style direct marketing, and its benefits for targeting undecided voters in key marginals, are shaping the adoption of Internet campaigning in both countries. Interestingly, however, the weaker role of candidate-controlled television exposure in the United Kingdom may act as more of a catalyst there.

Conclusion

This article aimed to suggest how we might move beyond some of the assumptions that have hitherto dominated discussions of online campaigning. The optimists’ belief that the Internet would remodel every existing institution has clearly not occurred as predicted. The normalizers’ prediction that power arrangements within existing institutions would simply be exported to the online environment is only partially accurate. Both focus on power and resources, but both do not take into account those elements of the institutional environment that influence the utility of new technology. Existing institutions can act as catalysts or anti-catalysts.

High levels of systemic institutional pluralism in the U.S., created by the separation of powers and federalism, ensure that American political parties remain much looser affiliations than their British counterparts. The lack of a permanent membership in American parties makes them more heavily election focused than those in Britain, and candidates do not find a ready-made campaign organization when they seek office. The Internet is emerging as a powerful tool for undertaking these tasks. These tendencies are even more acutely demonstrated in the primary system, which, with its low thresholds for entry and potential for mass participation, allows for internal party debate and dispute. The primary and the Internet are mutually reinforcing. Indeed, it could be argued that the reforms instigated within the Democratic Party in the 1970s have now taken on a whole new significance.

Campaign finance is another area where pre-existing institutions have an impact on Internet-based campaign strategies. In the United States, the primary system, particularly the money primary, give donations a greater influence on political outcomes. The Internet has made this process easier, and may, if the claims of the advocates of small-dollar democracy are accepted, be democratizing the process.

This article is only the starting point of a discussion of the relationship between institutions and the Internet. There is more work to be done in examining differences within political systems. Why, for
example, do the Democrats seem to be “better” at using the net than the Republicans? There are also questions about institutional development and design. In the U.K., for example, there is currently some unease about the way political parties are funded and a discussion of a range of options, including donation caps and state funding. Likewise, the Conservative Party is experimenting with primary contests for the London Mayoral elections in 2008. Clearly these and other relevant institutional changes would have ramifications for online politics that will need to be considered and understood.

The approach suggested here has the potential to help us better understand the complex interaction between institutions and new technology. The differences between British and American campaigning provide a compelling crucible, though the approach could be used to frame the comparison of other political systems. The five dimensions outlined—the level of systemic institutional pluralism, the organization of membership and supporters, the processes through which candidates are recruited and selected, the financial demands and regulations surrounding campaigns, and existing campaign communication structures—will play a role in explaining differences in Internet campaigning across a wide variety of political systems.

Guide to further reading

The growing importance of comparative approaches to online election campaigning can be gleaned from Foot et al.’s chapter in this volume, as well as the larger Internet and Elections Project (Kluver et al. (eds.), 2007).

Good representatives of the normalization approach include Davis (1999) and Margolis and Resnick (2000). The distilled essence of Internet optimism can be found in Morris (1999) and Trippi (2004).

Janda’s (1993) is an excellent overview of the literature on comparative party systems, while Eldersveld (1982) is the classic statement of stratarchy in the United States. Ware (1996) is strong on comparing party organization across countries, from a British perspective.

REFERENCES


All URLs were accessible on August 19, 2008.